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“Balancing” Free Expression and 
Religious Feelings in E.S. v. 
Austria: Blasphemy by Any 
Other Name? 
John G. Wrench1 
Abstract 
The European Court of Human Rights’ 2018 decision in E.S. v. 
Austria upheld an Austrian court’s conviction based on 
“disparaging religious doctrine.” The Court took this opportunity 
to reaffirm problematic, decades-old precedent, while creating 
new contradictions in its analysis of free expression claims. 
Despite the EU’s modern opposition to the criminalization of 
blasphemy, E.S. v. Austria in effect sends a contradictory 
message. This Comment explores the roots of the Court’s struggle 
to find an appropriate balance between the values of religious 
tolerance and freedom of expression, analyzes the Court’s recent 
decision, and suggests future paths to recalibrate the Court’s 
approach to these two fundamental rights.   
Table of Contents 
Abstract ......................................................................................... 735 
Table of Contents .......................................................................... 735 
Introduction ................................................................................... 736 
I. THE OFFENDING STATEMENTS, APPEALS, AND THE ECTHR’S 
RULING .................................................................................... 737 
A. Ms. E.S.’s Statements and Conviction in the Regional Court ........... 737 
B. Appeals in Austrian Courts .......................................................... 740 
C. The ECtHR Ruling ..................................................................... 741 
II. E.S. V. AUSTRIA REAFFIRMED OTTO-PREMINGER-INSTITUT; 
FUTURE CASES MUST ABANDON BOTH........................................ 743 
A. Organic Application of Precedent, or Strange Outgrowth? ............... 743 
B. Some Normative Problems with E.S. v. Austria, and Alternative 
Approaches ............................................................................... 747 
Conclusion ...................................................................................... 751 
 
1. J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Cleveland, Ohio, 
May 2019; B.A., Philosophy & Religious Studies, Pace University, 
Pleasantville, New York, December 2015. 
 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020) 




In 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) upheld 
an Austrian court’s conviction of a woman after she made several 
statements about Muhammad at a seminar on the “Basics of Islam.”2 
A member of the right-wing Freedom Party Education Institute, “Ms. 
E.S.” hosted two public seminars in 2014, where she criticized 
Muhammad’s relationship with his wife, Aisha.3 Ms. E.S. was 
subsequently convicted for “disparaging religious doctrines,” a criminal 
violation in Austria.4 
The ECtHR noted that although Article 10 of the Convention on 
Human Rights (the “Convention”) establishes a right to free expression, 
that right must be balanced against the right to religious freedom 
established by Article 9.5 Under the Court’s precedent, the right to free 
expression may be validly proscribed when it is incompatible with 
respect for the religion of others.6 Furthermore, as a departure from its 
typical free expression analysis, the ECtHR scrutinized the speaker’s 
objectivity, weighed the value judgment’s factual basis, and granted 
remarkable deference to Austria’s courts and legislative goals.7 The 
ECtHR held that both the statement’s weak factual basis and Ms. 
E.S.’s subjectivity militated against protecting her expression.8 
Furthermore, the Court concluded that states are obligated to restrict 
expression capable of inciting Muslims to “justified indignation.”9 
The ECtHR’s decision has been criticized by observers both within 
and outside the EU.10 Some commentators from nations with more 
absolutist free expression regimes, particularly the United States, were 
 
2. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 6-8, 58 (Oct. 25, 
2018), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-187188 
[https://perma.cc/RRX8-NTVB]. 
3. Id. ¶ 13.  
4. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. 
5. Id. ¶ 43. 
6. Id. ¶ 45. 
7. Id. ¶¶ 47, 48. 
8. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶¶ 54–55. 
9. Id. ¶ 57. 
10. See Stijn Smet, E.S. v. Austria: Freedom of Expression versus Religious 
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shocked at what appeared to be a draconian prosecution.11 Similarly, 
some within the EU viewed the case as a sign of the times—an 
indication that the EU is slipping deeper into an intolerant climate of 
speech-suppression.12  
This Comment explores the ECtHR’s problematic application of its 
free expression precedent, placing particular emphasis on the Court’s 
novel and contradictory analysis. Part I relates the facts of the case and 
the Court’s reasoning, while describing the doctrinal relationship 
between Article 9’s right to religious freedom and Article 10’s right to 
free expression. Part II analyzes the Court’s holding with the following 
questions in mind: First, is the holding in E.S. v. Austria an accurate 
application of the Court’s free expression and religious freedom 
precedents? Second, in a prescriptive spirit, what are the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Court’s approach in light of the rights protected by 
the Convention on Human Rights? The Comment concludes with 
suggestions for how the ECtHR should recalibrate its approach to the 
interaction of free expression and religious freedom, to better protect 
both fundamental rights in the future. 
I. THE OFFENDING STATEMENTS, APPEALS, AND THE 
ECTHR’S RULING 
A. Ms. E.S.’s Statements and Conviction in the Regional Court 
In 2008, Ms. E.S. began holding seminars on the “Basics of Islam” 
at the Freedom Party Education Institute (“Freedom Party”) in 
Vienna.13 Those interested in attending could learn about upcoming 
seminars as Freedom Party members, as invitees, or by viewing the 
publicly accessible Freedom Party website.14 The Freedom Party also 
advertised the lectures through leaflets “specifically aimed at young 
voters,” inviting attendees to take part in a “free education package.”15 
The two seminars at which Ms. E.S. made the statements in question 
 
11. See, e.g., Simon Cottee, A Flawed European Ruling on Free Speech, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2018) (suggesting that “it is hard not to read the . . 
. ruling as a concession to those who wouldn’t hesitate to interpret E.S.’s 
comments not just as offensive, but as deserving of a murderous 
retaliation.”); see also Brendan O’Neill, In Europe and in Pakistan, Two 
Women Are Condemned for Insulting Muhammad, REASON (Nov. 1, 2018) 
(“Pluralism cannot survive without free expression, and free expression 
requires tolerance of criticism . . . [the ECtHR] has failed not only to 
defend the liberty of E.S., but of all Europeans—Christian, Muslim, and 
atheists alike.”).  
12. See Smet, supra note 10 (describing the Court’s reasoning as a “contrived” 
and “nonsensical” extension of the Court’s existing precedent).  
13. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶¶ 6-7. 
14. Id. ¶ 7. 
15. Id. 
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were held in October and November of the following year, with 
approximately thirty participants attending each seminar.16 One 
attendee—an undercover journalist—reported Ms. E.S.’s statements to 
their employer, who contacted the local authorities.17 
Following an investigation, the prosecutor initially brought charges 
against Ms. E.S. for “inciting hatred,” but Vienna’s Regional Criminal 
Court acquitted her for two reasons.18 First, the prosecutor willingly 
withdrew the indictment as applied to particular statements; and 
second, the prosecutor failed to establish that Ms. E.S. made some of 
the statements as written in the indictment.19 Her victory was short-
lived, as the Regional Court nevertheless convicted Ms. E.S. of 
“disparaging religious doctrines.”20 
The Regional Court identified three specific statements on which 
the conviction was based.21 First, Ms. E.S. argued that Muslims, 
specifically male Muslims, are called to imitate Muhammad because he 
is seen as the ideal man.22 She then criticized that expectation, on the 
grounds that Muhammad was a “warlord,” had “many women,” and 
“liked to do it with children.”23 Second, Ms. E.S. stated that the Sahih 
Al-Bukhari is the most important of the Hadith collections, where “the 
thing with Aisha and child sex is written.”24 Third, Ms. E.S. repeated 
a conversation she had with her sister, in which she stated, “A 56-year-
old and a six-year-old? What do you call that? Give me an example? 
What do we call it, if it is not paedophilia?”25  
Some background on what Ms. E.S. was referring to is important 
for understanding the context of the court’s analysis. Aisha was the 
third wife of Muhammad and daughter of the first caliph, Abu Bakr.26 
In one of the “most authentic collections” of the Sahih al-Bukhari 
hadith, Aisha stated that “[t]he Messenger of God married me when I 
 
16. Id. ¶ 8. 
17. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. 
18. Id. ¶¶ 10, 12. 
19. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 12. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. ¶ 13. 
22. Id.  
23. Id.  
24. Id.  
25. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 13. 
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was six, and consummated the marriage with me when I was nine.”27 
In response to both external criticism and inter-Islamic debate, some 
scholars justify the marriage in historical context,28 while others 
challenge the accuracy of Aisha’s statement.29  
The Regional Court found that Ms. E.S.’s statements “essentially 
conveyed” that Muhammad had “paedophilic tendencies” and 
suggested that he was not a “worthy subject of worship.”30 The court 
stated that the term “paedophile” implied a “primary sexual interest” 
in pre-pubescent children, which disregarded the fact that Aisha 
remained with Muhammad until his death—when she was eighteen 
years old and clearly past the age of puberty.31 The court concluded 
that the statements were “capable of causing indignation,” and that it 
was possible for at least a portion of the audience to be disturbed by 
the statements.32  
The Regional Court rejected that Ms. E.S.’s statements were 
protected by Article 10’s right to free expression, relying on two 
separate but related points. First, while Section 1 of Article 10 
establishes that individuals have the right to free expression, the court 
noted that the right is subject to “duties and responsibilities” under 
Section 2.33 Such duties include refraining from making statements 
which “hurt others without reason and therefore did not contribute to 
a debate of public interest.”34 The court found that Ms. E.S. had not 
made statements of fact, but value judgments aimed at “degrad[ing] 
Muhammad,” outside of Article 10’s protection.35 Second, Article 9’s 
protection of the freedom to religion can require States to ensure that 
religious views are not attacked in a “provocative way capable of 
 




prophet/ [https://perma.cc/6GAY-SNF9].  
28. See, e.g., COLIN TURNER, ISLAM: THE BASICS 34 (2d ed. 2011) (stating that 
“[a] marriage between an older man and a young girl was customary 
among the Bedouins,” particularly if the marriage had “direct political 
significance” to the families). 
29. See, e.g., MAULANA MUHAMMAD ALI & JOHN HAYTON, MUHAMMAD THE 
PROPHET (2011) (stating that Aisha “could not have been less than ten” 
at the time of her marriage).  
30. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 14. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. ¶ 15. 
34. Id. 
35. Id.  
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hurting the feelings” of religious individuals.36 Thus, after balancing the 
rights at stake, the court held that Ms. E.S.’s conviction was justified 
and necessary to “protect religious peace” in Austria.37 
B. Appeals in Austrian Courts 
Ms. E.S. appealed the Regional Court’s judgment on several 
grounds. First, that her statements were not value judgments, but 
statements of fact based on the documents submitted for evidence;38 
second, that she had merely questioned whether an adult having sexual 
intercourse with a nine-year-old “amounted to paedophilia”;39 and, 
third, that she had used the term “paedophile” in the way it was 
commonly used—referring to “men who have sex with minors”—not in 
a strict scientific sense.40 Lastly, Ms. E.S. reiterated that her statements 
were protected by Article 10’s establishment of the right to “impart 
opinions and ideas that offend, shock, or disturb.”41  
The Vienna Court of Appeals (the “Court of Appeals”) dismissed 
Ms. E.S.’s claim, affirming the lower court’s factual findings and noting 
that her statements were “wrong and offensive” even if the factual claim 
was accurate.42 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals stated that 
“paedophilia” denotes a primary sexual interest in children, and 
therefore no “reliable sources” supported Ms. E.S.’s statements.43 The 
Court of Appeals concluded that Article 10 permits individuals to 
express “harsh criticism of churches or religious societies,” this 
protection ends at “insults and mockery of a religious belief or person 
of worship.”44  
Ms. E.S. next lodged an appeal with the Austrian Supreme Court, 
which dismissed her application and upheld the lower court’s 
reasoning.45 Interferences with Article 10’s protections could be justified 
by the need to protect religious peace and religious feelings under 
Article 9,46 and courts must balance these rights to determine whether 
 
36. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 15. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. ¶ 16. 
39. Id.  
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 17. 
43. Id. ¶ 18. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. ¶¶ 20-22. 
46. Id. ¶ 21. 
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a statement is capable of “arousing justified indignation.”47 The court 
held that, as a consequences of balancing Articles 9 and 10, Ms. E.S. 
had aimed to defame Muhammad in order to show that he was not 
worthy of worship—not to “contribute to a serious debate about Islam 
or the phenomenon of child marriage.”48  
C. The ECtHR Ruling 
Ms. E.S. appealed to the ECtHR, which issued its ruling on October 
25, 2018.49 The ECtHR pointed out that both parties agreed that there 
had been an interference with Ms. E.S.’s right to free expression.50 That 
interference, however, could be justified if it was “prescribed by law,” 
pursued a “legitimate aim” under Section 2 of Article 10 and was 
“necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve that aim.51 The 
Court moved quickly through the first two questions—the Austrian law 
prescribed convictions for disparaging religious doctrines, for the 
legitimate aims of safeguarding religious peace and protecting religious 
feelings.52 These aims constituted “protecting the rights of others” 
under Section 2 of Article 10 and could therefore justify an interference 
with the right to free expression.53 The issue was thus whether or not 
Ms. E.S.’s conviction was “necessary in a democratic society” to achieve 
those aims.54 
The ECtHR began its analysis by examining Article 10’s two 
sections.55 Section 1 establishes the right to free expression, while 
Section 2 states there are duties and responsibilities for those exercising 
the right.56 Under Otto-Preminger-Institute,57 the Court continued, 
Article 9 justifies the restriction of “gratuitously offensive” and 
“profane” expressions: 
Where such expressions go beyond the limits of a critical denial 
of other people’s religious beliefs and are likely to incite religious 
intolerance, for example in the event of an improper or even 
abusive attack on an object of religious veneration, a State may 
 
47. Id. 
48. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 22. 
49. Id. ¶ 58. 
50. Id. ¶ 39. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. ¶¶ 40, 41. 
53. Id. ¶ 41. 
54. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 42. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. See Smet, supra note 8. 
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legitimately consider them to be incompatible with respect for the 
freedom of thought, consciences and religion and take 
proportionate restrictive measures . . .58 
Furthermore, national authorities are due a “margin of 
appreciation” in determining whether a restriction is necessary in a 
democratic society, to account for the lack of a uniform conception of 
morality in the EU.59 
The ECtHR proceeded to apply these principles, affirming the lower 
courts’ holdings on several grounds.60 First, the ECtHR stated that Ms. 
E.S.—as an “expert in the field of Islamic doctrine”—”must have been 
aware that her statements were partly based on untrue facts and apt 
to arouse (justified) indignation.”61 Therefore, not only did her 
statements fail to further the purposes of Article 10, but national 
authorities had a positive duty under Article 9 to restrict these 
statements to ensure an “atmosphere of mutual tolerance.”62 Second, 
although courts are incapable of judging the truth of a value 
judgment,63 the ECtHR found that Ms. E.S.’s statements were not 
based on a “sufficient factual basis” to receive protection under Article 
10.64 Lastly, the Court held that the conviction and attendant fine were 
not disproportionate in light of how strict the punishment could have 
been.65 The Court concluded that the Austrian courts had not 
overstepped their “wide” margin of appreciation in determining the 
balance between Ms. E.S.’s “right to free expression with the rights of 
others to have their religious feelings protected . . .”66 
 
58. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 40. 
59. Id. ¶ 44 (“The absence of a uniform European conception of the 
requirements of the protection of the rights of others in relation to attacks 
on their religious convictions broadens the Contracting States’ margin of 
appreciation when regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters 
liable to offend personal convictions within the sphere of morals or 
religion.”).  
60. Id. ¶ 53. 
61. Id.  
62. Id. 
63. Id. ¶ 54. 
64. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 54. 
65. See id. ¶ 56 (stating that “the fine imposed was on the lower end” of the 
statutory range and that the “Criminal Code alternatively would have 
provided for up to six months’ imprisonment.”). 
66. Id. ¶ 57.  
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II. E.S. V. AUSTRIA REAFFIRMED OTTO-PREMINGER-
INSTITUT; FUTURE CASES MUST ABANDON BOTH 
A. Organic Application of Precedent, or Strange Outgrowth? 
A fundamental premise of the ECtHR’s holding is that a national 
authority can justifiably restrict expressions capable of hurting religious 
feelings or religious peace.67 Reading the text of Article 9, it is not 
obvious that the right to religious freedom could be violated by 
mocking, insulting, or harshly critical expressions. Indeed, the concept 
that gratuitously offensive expressions can interfere with the right to 
freedom of religion stems from the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 9 
in Otto-Preminger-Institut.68 
Otto-Preminger-Institut revolved around an organization that 
attempted to host six showings of a film, Das Liebeskonzil (“Council of 
Love”69), which caricatured several features of Christian belief.70 
Advertisements did not include information about the film’s content, 
the showings were age-restricted, and attendees were required to pay a 
“fee” to enter.71 The film was to be shown in a majority-Catholic area. 
The organization was convicted for disparaging religious doctrines after 
being reported by a Catholic organization.72  
The ECtHR upheld the conviction in Otto-Preminger-Institut, 
finding that in “extreme cases,” particular “methods of opposing or 
denying religious beliefs can . . . inhibit those who hold such beliefs 
from exercising their freedom to hold and express them.”73 
Furthermore, the ECtHR noted that the goals of Article 10 are not 
achieved by protecting “gratuitously offensive” expressions, which are 
incapable of contributing to “any form of public debate.”74 The ECtHR 
concluded by noting that while national authorities are due a “certain 
margin of appreciation” in determining whether an interference was 
necessary in a democratic society, the margin of appreciation is not 
 
67. Id. 
68. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34 (1994) 
[hereinafter Otto-Preminger-Institut]. 
69. The ECtHR translated the title as “Council in Heaven” in English, but 
“the French text of the decision, more accurately . . . translated [it] as ‘Le 
Concile d’amour.’” Javier Martínez-Torrón, Limitations on Religious 
Freedom in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 19 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 587, n. 144 (2005). 
70. Otto-Preminger-Institut, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 34. 
71. Id. at 44. 
72. Id. at 37. 
73. Id. at 43. 
74. Id. 
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“unlimited.”75 Moreover, in cases where there has been an interference 
with the rights protected by Article 10, “supervision must be strict 
because of the importance of the freedoms in question.”76 
In some ways, the ECtHR’s holding in E.S. v. Austria follows 
naturally from Otto-Preminger-Institut.  First, and perhaps most 
important, is the principle that Article 9 obligates national authorities 
to restrict expressions capable of hurting religious feelings or disrupting 
religious peace.77 The Court merely reapplies this doctrine in E.S. v. 
Austria.78 Secondly, in E.S. v. Austria, the ECtHR simply cited Otto-
Preminger-Institut for the idea that Article 10’s goals are not achieved 
by protecting “gratuitously offensive” expressions, as they do not 
contribute to public dialogue.79 A third application of Otto-Preminger-
Institut is the Court’s finding that convictions based on “disparaging 
religious doctrines” (the same conviction in both Otto-Preminger-
Institut and E.S. v. Austria) for the purpose of protecting religious 
feelings and religious peace, is a legitimate goal and justifies an 
interference with Article 10.80 Lastly, the ECtHR upheld the 
convictions in Otto-Preminger-Institut and E.S. v. Austria even though 
no individual’s religious feelings were actually harmed—the expression’s 
ability to create “justified indignation” was entirely hypothetical.81 
By introducing other questions into its analysis, however, the 
ECtHR’s holding represents a consequential shift in how the Court 
balances the relationship between Articles 9 and 10. Outside of Article 
9’s affirmative duty to protect religious freedom, the Court’s holding 
relies on two separate lines of reasoning. We will describe one as 
“veracity-based” arguments—which weaken the applicability of Article 
10’s protection, and “deference-based” arguments—which justify the 
Court’s deference to Austria’s legislative goals and judicial findings.  
The ECtHR’s veracity-based focus is clear by its delving into 
semantic definitions, requiring that those seeking to exercise their right 
to free expression do so “objectively,” and its weighing of the quantum 
of evidence requisite to render a value-judgment sufficiently “without 
factual basis” to strip it of Article 10 protection.82 The ECtHR adopted 
the Regional Court’s finding that “paedophilia” is defined as a primary 
sexual interest in prepubescent children, despite Ms. E.S.’s argument 
 
75. Id. at 44. 
76. Otto-Preminger-Institut, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 44. 
77. See E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 57. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. ¶ 43.  
80. Id. ¶ 58. 
81. Id. ¶ 57; Otto-Preminger-Institut, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 60. 
82. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 57. 
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that the term is commonly used in a broader sense—to refer to men 
who have sex with children.83 Endorsing the narrower definition led the 
Court to conclude that Ms. E.S. was essentially lying in the seminars.84 
Relatedly, the Court held that Ms. E.S.’s failure to present information 
in an “objective” way increased the probability that her statements 
could arouse justified indignation.85 Thus, because her “subjective” 
statements did not contribute to Article 10’s purpose of encouraging a 
debate of public interest, the Court more easily concluded that an 
interference was justified by other concerns.86 Lastly, although the 
ECtHR noted that “the truth of value judgments [are] not susceptible 
of proof,” it characterized Ms. E.S.’s statements as value-judgments 
“without sufficient factual basis.”87 Article 10, the Court concluded, 
does not protect statements which are “based on (manifestly) untrue” 
facts.88 This focus on veracity or truthfulness is distinct from the 
concerns articulated in Otto-Preminger-Institut, namely, that a 
majority-Catholic population might be offended by a film depicting 
religious figures in insulting ways.89 
Secondly, the Court repeatedly stated that national authorities are 
due a “wide” margin of appreciation in determining whether an 
interference with Article 10 is “necessary in a democratic society.”90 
The ECtHR’s framing of the margin of appreciation as “wide” or 
“broad” is not born out of the Court’s earlier holding in Otto-
 
83. Id. ¶¶ 53, 54. 
84. See id. ¶ 53 (agreeing that Ms. E.S.’s characterization was “partly based 
on untrue facts”; see also id. ¶ 54 (stating alternatively that Ms. E.S. had 
failed to adduce “any evidence” that her statements had a factual basis).  
85. Id. ¶ 52 (accepting the domestic courts’ analysis that the statements “had 
not been made in an objective manner aimed at contributing to a debate 
of public interest”).  
86. Id. ¶ 57. 
87. Id. ¶¶ 48, 54.  
88. E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 55. 
89. See Otto-Preminger-Institut, at 59 (finding that the film’s advertisements 
were sufficiently public to “cause offence”); see also id. (emphasizing that 
“the Roman Catholic religion is the religion of the overwhelming majority 
of Tyroleans.”). 
90. See E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶ 15 (stating the “interference 
with applicant’s freedom of expression...had been necessary in a 
democratic society.”). See also id. ¶ 44 (stating that the lack of uniform 
requirements for protecting religious convictions “broadens the . . . margin 
of appreciation when regulating freedom of expression”; id. ¶ 50 
(“domestic authorities had a wide margin of appreciation . . . as they were 
in a better position to evaluate which statements were likely to disturb 
the religious peace in their country.”) (emphasis added); id. ¶ 58 (“[T]he 
domestic courts did not overstep their – wide – margin of appreciation in 
the instant case . . .”). 
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Preminger-Institut.91 To the contrary, in that case the ECtHR clearly 
stated that while a “certain” margin of appreciation is due to national 
authorities: 
“The authorities’ margin of appreciation . . . is not unlimited. It 
goes hand in hand with Convention supervision, the scope of 
which will vary according to the circumstances. In cases such as 
the present one, where there has been an interference with the 
exercise of the freedoms guaranteed in [Article 10], the 
supervision must be strict because of the importance of the 
freedoms in question. The necessity for any restriction must be 
convincingly established.”92 
Nowhere in Otto-Preminger-Institut does the ECtHR refer to the 
margin of appreciation as a concept broadened or expanded beyond the 
standard “regard” due to national authorities.93 Indeed, Judges Palm, 
Pekkanen, and Makarczyk dissented to reiterate that permissible 
reasons for interfering with Article 10 “must be narrowly interpreted; 
the State’s margin of appreciation in this field cannot be a wide one.”94  
Otto-Preminger-Institut ultimately provides the doctrinal 
cornerstone of the Court’s decision in E.S. v. Austria, despite any 
innovations or novel analysis introduced by the latter case. Indeed, 
Otto-Preminger-Institut provides the logic for subordinating 
“gratuitously offensive” expressions to the need for religious peace.95 
Without a framework allowing national authorities to restrict 
hypothetically offensive statements in the name of protecting religious 
peace or religious feelings, the Court may have reached an alternate 
holding in E.S. v. Austria. The ECtHR’s departures from Otto-
Preminger-Institut, manifested in the veracity and deference-based 
analyses, will likely influence subsequent decisions. The two major shifts 
noted above—the Court’s interrogation of the statement’s factual basis 
or speaker’s intentions, and increased deference to national 
 
91. See Javier Martínez-Torrón, supra note 69, at 601 (noting that “the 
Council of Europe gathered a reduced number of States that shared a 
relatively uniform concept of democracy and civil liberties.”).   
92. See Otto-Preminger-Institut, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 57–58 (emphasis 
added). 
93. See id. at 59 (noting that “regard must be had to the margin of 
appreciation left to the national authorities”); see also id. (finding that 
the nation had not “overstepped their margin of appreciation” in 
“assess[ing] the need” for a particular restriction).  
94. Otto-Preminger-Institut, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 60–61 (Judges Palm, 
Pekkanen and Makarczyk, dissenting). 
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authorities—will undoubtedly be cited in subsequent cases to justify 
the necessity of interferences with rights protected by Article 10. 
B. Some Normative Problems with E.S. v. Austria, and Alternative 
Approaches 
Skeptics offer a plethora of reasons to doubt that the ECtHR’s 
current doctrine adequately protects free expression. Indeed, the 
reasoning employed in E.S. v. Austria has proven somewhat frustrating 
for those living within, or aspiring to adopt the principles of, nations 
with more absolutist free expression regimes. The following issues, 
however, stem from contradictions within the ECtHR’s own approach 
to balancing rights established by Articles 9 and 10.  
Austria’s “disparaging religious doctrines” offense amounts to a 
blasphemy law and the ECtHR’s arguments to the contrary are 
unpersuasive. The EU has recently acknowledged the inherent tension 
between the right to free expression and blasphemy laws, repeatedly 
disavowing such laws in recent history.96 Calls to abolish blasphemy 
convictions simultaneously accept that nations must punish actual 
incitement, distinguishing between merely offensive expression and 
those with a causal connection to subsequent religious hatred.97 
Initially, Ms. E.S. was charged with (and acquitted of) “inciting 
hatred.”98 It is telling that, despite the EU’s insistence on dismantling 
blasphemy laws and the ECtHR’s insistence that it was not enforcing 
a blasphemy law, Ms. E.S. was acquitted of inciting hatred and 
ultimately convicted for making statements that could hurt religious 
feelings.99 
The ECtHR’s analysis went beyond Otto-Preminger-Institut, 
focusing on issues that have little material connection to Ms. E.S.’s 
claim under Article 10. The Court framed Ms. E.S.’s statements 
 
96. See, e.g., Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 
1805 (2007), ¶ 4 [hereinafter Recommendation 1805] (“[B]lasphemy, as 
an insult to a religion, should not be deemed a criminal offense . . . [e]ven 
though today prosecutions in this respect are rare in member states, they 
are legion in other countries of the world.”). See also European 
Commission for Democracy through Law, Report on the Relationship 
Between Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion, CDL-AD 
(2008)026, § 92 [hereinafter Democracy through Law Report] (noting that 
“criminal sanctions are inappropriate in respect of insult to religious 
feelings and, even more so, in respect of blasphemy.”). 
97. See Recommendation 1805, supra note 96, ¶ 15 (suggesting that “national 
laws should only penalize expressions about religious matters which 
intentionally and severely disturb public order and call for public 
violence.”); see also Democracy through Law Report, supra note 95, § 90 
([I]n [the Commission’s] view, criminal sanctions are only appropriate in 
respect of incitement to hatred . . .”). 
98. See E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶¶ 10, 12.  
99. See id. ¶ 12. 
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regarding paedophilia as a subjective judgment, primarily because it 
adopted the narrow definition proposed by the Regional Court.100 By 
construing the statements as lacking factual basis and context, the 
Court was in a position to make its next two points: Article 10 does 
not protect value-judgments without sufficient factual basis; and, 
Article 10’s goals are not achieved without objective consideration of 
public issues.101 While both points (albeit unpersuasively) lessen the 
importance of protecting Ms. E.S.’s statements under Article 10, they 
have little connection to the issue of “religious peace.”   
The Court’s analysis effectively invites courts to resolve free 
expression cases through semantics and historical exegesis.102 It is 
doubtful, however, that objectiveness and factual sufficiency are truly 
determinative in the Court’s analysis. Imagine, for example, that Ms. 
E.S.’s statements were made “objectively” and with “sufficient factual-
basis” (placing them fully within the protection of Article 10)—are they 
therefore incapable of damaging religious peace? Probably not, and 
perhaps the ECtHR would hold in such a case that her statements could 
nevertheless be restricted solely based on fears of harming religious 
feelings. That holding would bring the following question to the 
forefront:  does Otto-Preminger-Institut permit states to silence 
factually accurate, objective statements merely because a hypothetical 
third-party’s religious feelings could be hurt? If so, one might wonder 
how such a rule is truly compatible with a right to free expression.  
The ECtHR found a convenient way to avoid that question. 
Instead, the Court took a belt-and-suspenders approach by relying on 
Otto-Preminger-Institut for an affirmative duty to police religiously 
offensive expression, while collecting reasons for why the statements 
were not objective or factual enough to deserve full Article 10 
protection.103 If the ECtHR honestly believes that the rights protected 
by Articles 9 and 10 must be “balanced” when they conflict, then it 
should at least respect the right to free expression instead of narrowing 
 
100. It appears, however, that the ECtHR doubted the Regional Court’s logical 
conclusion that someone could not be a paedophile if they marry and 
remain married to the child past pubescence. See id ¶ 50 (“Accordingly, 
and notwithstanding some of the domestic courts’ considerations such as 
the duration of the marriage in question . . .”). 
101. Id. ¶¶ 54, 57. 
102. See Smet, supra note 12 (“By going down this road, the Court reduces 
the case to a single factual question: is having sex with one child 1,400 
years ago enough to be labelled a paedophile today? That is an 
exceedingly narrow view of the case and entirely unhelpful for its 
resolution.”).  
103. Otto-Preminger-Institut, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 59–60 (discussing why the 
statements made did not violate Article 10). 
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it beyond recognition.104 Following E.S. v. Austria, one wonders 
whether the Court has created a doctrine in which even truthful 
statements necessarily acquiesce to others’ religious feelings.  
The ECtHR could resolve these tensions while still protecting both 
fundamental rights, but not without doctrinal changes. First, the 
ECtHR can both protect the right to religious freedom and overrule 
Otto-Preminger-Institut by judging expression under an incitement 
standard.105 By using incitement, expressions that actually called for 
public violence or harassed religious individuals could be limited. In 
comparison—as Otto-Preminger-Institut is currently applied—
emphasizing the feelings of a hypothetical third-party functionally 
makes “disparaging religious doctrine” a victimless crime. Importantly, 
The EU has already suggested this option106 and the Court gave it lip-
service in E.S. v. Austria.107 Requiring incitement would put an end to 
blasphemy convictions, instead of allowing them under the guise of 
“disparaging religious doctrine.”108 Furthermore, incitement would take 
the emphasis off of the speaker’s “objectiveness” and factual basis of 
their subjective opinion, instead focusing on the effects of their 
expression. An incitement standard would also allow courts to focus on 
more concrete factual questions, compared to whether or not some 
hypothetical third party’s religious feelings have been hurt. Lastly, an 
incitement standard is the practical way to ensure that religious ideas 
are subject to the same criticism as any other idea, while allowing 
nations to protect the right to freedom of religion. The Court’s current 
doctrine insulates religious individuals from potential insult, while 
hypothetically protecting the same statements about a non-religious 
 
104. See Graeme Wood, In Europe, Speech Is an Alienable Right, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 27, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/its-not-free-speech-
criticize-muhammad-echr-ruled/574174/ [https://perma.cc/AWW8-
3AKJ] ([I]f European courts assess freedom of speech at barely a feather’s 
weight, as it appears in [E.S. v. Austria], they should spare us their 
sanctimony and admit that they do not value free expression at all.”). 
105. For example, whether a statement directed towards an individual has the 
tendency to incite an immediate breach of the peace. This language tracks 
a portion of the United States’ free speech exception for “fighting words,” 
articulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315. U.S. 568, 571–72 
(1942).  
106. See Recommendation 1805, supra note 97. 
107. See E.S. v. Austria, App. No. 38450/12, ¶¶ 27-29. 
108. See Smet, supra note 12; see also Simon Cottee, A Flawed European 
Ruling on Free Speech, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/europe-rules-
against-free-speech/574369/ [https://perma.cc/96PQ-73CW] (“[E.S. v. 
Austria] has given legitimacy to what is in all but name an Austrian 
blasphemy law …”). 
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subject.109 Drawing the line at actual incitement would do away with 
this double-standard. 
Second, adopting an incitement standard would helpfully 
recalibrate how the ECtHR applies the margin of appreciation. 
Currently, national authorities partake in judicial augury when 
determining whether some hypothetical third party’s religious feelings 
could have been harmed. By applying a “wide” margin of appreciation, 
reviewing courts like the ECtHR only add a wider margin of error in 
determining whether religious peace is actually protected. By placing 
only incitement to religious hatred outside of Article 10’s protection, 
national authorities would make factual determinations as to whether 
or not an expression was capable of causing an immediate incitement 
of religious hatred. Reviewing courts, including the ECtHR, could 
thereby grant a margin of appreciation in their analysis while protecting 
the right to free expression.  
One final note on the principle of judicial deference inherent in the 
margin of appreciation. Courts necessarily struggle with how to enforce 
enumerated rights while granting proper deference to local legislatures 
attempting to address social issues—difficulties in applying that 
balance abound outside the ECtHR and EU. It may be illustrative to 
recall a debate that occurred in the United States, between then-Judge 
Antonin Scalia and Professor Richard Epstein, on the proper amount 
of deference owed by courts to legislatures. In his article, Judge Scalia 
noted that “[m]any believe” that the American system has suffered from 
“judicializing . . . social judgments that ought better be left to the 
democratic process.”110 While criticizing “extravagant” versions of this 
view, Scalia nevertheless concluded that the courts acting as an 
“alternate legislature” is a “the distinctive threat of our times.”111  
Professor Epstein’s response has rather obvious application to the 
ECtHR’s current approach to individual rights:  
Judicial restraint is fine when it keeps courts from intervening in 
areas where they have no business intervening. But the world 
always has two kinds of errors: the error of commission (type I) 
and the error of omission (type II) . . . what Scalia has, in effect 
argued for is to minimize type I error. We run our system by 
 
109. See Douglas Murray, Should It Be Illegal to Call Mohammed a Paedophile, 
THE SPECTATOR (Oct. 27, 2018), https://spectator.us/illegal-mohammed-
pedophile/ [https://perma.cc/J5U3-HLSM] (suggesting that the ECtHR 
has created a “two-tier critical environment in Europe,” in which some 
offensive statements are restricted merely because they are directed 
towards religious subjects). 
110. Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, in SCALIA V. 
EPSTEIN: TWO VIEWS ON JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 4 (Cato Inst. 1985).  
111. Id. 
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being most afraid of intervention where it is not appropriate. My 
view is that we should minimize both types of error.112 
The ECtHR currently applies the margin of appreciation in a way 
that suggests a similar fear of intervening where inappropriate. Indeed, 
other academics have recognized that deference via the margin of 
appreciation doctrine often acts as an obstacle to the enforcement of 
human rights.113 The ECtHR thus appears to be focusing almost 
entirely on avoiding “type I” errors at the cost of enforcing rights 
protected in the Convention. The amount of political theorizing 
required to address the cause (or causes) of the Court’s pattern of 
deference is simply beyond the scope of this Comment. Suffice it to say, 
however, that without a drastic change in doctrine, one could predict 
the pattern to continue with all its attendant consequences for 
individual rights.  
Conclusion 
The ECtHR must adopt a different theory of causation to resolve 
the tensions in its contradictory treatment of Articles 9 and 10. At its 
core, the direction of the Court’s doctrine on the relationship between 
Articles 9 and 10 displays a serious mistrust of citizens’ resilience to 
bad ideas and expression in general.114 Otto-Preminger-Institut is 
merely a manifestation of this theory of causality, in that it draws a 
 
112. Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Review: Reckoning on Two Kinds of Error, 
in SCALIA V. EPSTEIN: TWO VIEWS ON JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 15 (Cato Inst. 
1985). 
113. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and 
Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 843, 844 (1999) 
(“Margin of appreciation, with its principled recognition of moral 
relativism, is at odds with the concept of the universality of human rights. 
If applied liberally, this doctrine can undermine seriously the promise of 
international enforcement of human rights that overcomes national 
policies.”); see also Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and 
the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the 
Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113, 138 (2004) (recounting Lord 
Lester’s appraisal of the doctrine as “standardless . . . the concept of the 
margin of appreciation has become as slippery and elusive as an eel. Again 
and again the Court now appears to use the margin of appreciation as a 
substitute for coherent legal analysis of the issues at stake.”).  
114. See Wood, supra note 102 (arguing that “virtually limitless debate has 
proven highly capable” of discrediting ideas like Holocaust denial); see 
also Marko Milanovic, Legitimizing Blasphemy Laws Through the 
Backdoor: The European Court’s Judgment in E.S. v. Austria, EJIL: 
TALK! (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/legitimizing-blasphemy-
laws-through-the-backdoor-the-european-courts-judgment-in-e-s-v-
austria/ [https://perma.cc/SDV3-D99U] (suggesting that the Court 
enforced a “vigilant nanny state” variety of religious tolerance instead of 
encouraging public debate). 
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direct connection between “gratuitously offensive” statements and an 
interference with the right to practice one’s religion.115 The Court’s 
theory of how expression causes subsequent harm is similarly reflected 
in E.S. v. Austria. Ms. E.S. was in no sense “objective” in her 
discussions,116 but to imply that individuals cannot ferret out hyperbole 
or untruths without the state’s help is a dangerous idea.   
One can easily imagine why, in light of history, many nations in 
the EU would rather provide religious freedom with disproportionate 
protection under the Convention. Bad ideas can have consequences, but 
so do blasphemy laws. The ECtHR must acknowledge that the citizens 
under its jurisdiction are the intermediaries between bad ideas and bad 
acts. That being said, even the United States’ rough-and-tumble free 
expression regime draws a line between merely offensive expression and 
expression directed towards and likely to produce imminent lawless 
action,117 or constitutes a true threat.118 Short of adopting the United 
States’ free expression regime, the ECtHR could simply institute the 
EU’s own suggestion that expression should only be restricted if it 
incites religious hatred. This standard would create a workable 
relationship between the need to protect free expression and the 
pluralistic call for religious freedom. In finding a proper balance 
between these two fundamental rights, that would be a start.  
 
 
115. Otto-Preminger-Institut, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 57. 
116. See Cottee, supra note 108 (noting that while Ms. E.S. was not speaking 
in the “spirit of objectivity” . . . E.S.’s statements [about Muhammad] 
were not phrased in a neutral manner aimed at being an objective 
contribution.”). 
117. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
118. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
